cars - Battle of Dien Bien Phu

The Battle of Dien Bien Phu (Điện Biên Phủ) occurred in 1954 between Viet Minh forces under Vo Nguyen Giap and French airborne and Foreign Legion forces. The battle was fought near the village of Dien Bien Phu in northern Vietnam and became the last battle between the French and the Vietnamese in the First Indochina War which had begun in 1947.

Contents

Background

In 1953, the French had started the process of strengthening their defenses in the Hanoi delta region and were generally preparing for a series of offenses against the Viet Minh staging areas in north-west Vietnam. They had also set up a number of fortifed towns and outposts in the area, including Lai-Chau near the Chinese border to the north, Na San to the west of Hanoi, and Luang-Prabang and Plaine de Jarres in northern Laos.

That spring, General Giap launched a major offensive against Na San. After several days of fierce fighting, the Viet Minh were broken, leaving 1,544 casualties at the base and another 1,932 walking wounded. He withdrew the majority of his forces but left small numbers to hamper any attempt at a French withdrawal. Nevertheless, French General Henri Navarre successfully withdrew the forces from Nan Sanh soon after his arrival in May.

It was at this point that the French started thinking about Dien Bien Phu. In pitched battles the superior firepower of the French forces invariably won out, but the Viet Minh had generally avoided such battles in the past. It appeared that the war would be entering a new phase, however, as the ranks of the Viet Minh were growing, and there was a general need for them to be involved in some action. The French reasoned that if a smaller, hastily prepared base like Na San could do so much damage in a pitched battle, a well-planned one could bring the enemy to task.

Several sites were studied, but Dien Bien Phu always rose to the top. The village lay in a bowl-shaped valley with a bottom that was flat enough for a major airbase, was near or on several major roads, and was surrounded by easily defendable hills. If the hills could be taken, the valley would be secure and could be used as a major air-supply route.

All of the advantages for the French were equal disadvantages for the Viet Minh. A number of their troop concentrations were on the far side of the valley, supplied via the roads that would be cut. These forces would be forced to either move east over considerably rougher terrain or attempt to open the roads with an attack on the base itself; the French hoped for the latter. In addition, the same terrain should prevent the movement of the Viet Minh's Chinese-supplied artillery into the area.

On the downside, Dien Bien Phu was far enough from Saigon that, if a major fight did break out, the French air transport units would be hard-pressed to keep up with demands. Although they believed they were barely able to make it "work", no steps were taken to improve this vital part of the operation.

In late 1953, as both sides prepared for peace talks, the French decided to strengthen their hand at the table with one major victory, and started the process of taking Dien Bien Phu.

Operation Castor

Operations at Dien Bien Phu began on the morning of November 20, 1953, when Operation Castor dropped or flew 9,000 troops into the area over three days. These troops started construction of a huge airbase in the valley with two airstrips and set out to capture and fortify the eight hills surrounding the valley, each named for the former girlfriends of the French commanding officer. By early 1954 the troop count had risen to 13,000; there were also a number of artillery units and several light tanks.

The Viet Minh were too spread out to interfere with these preparations, and there was some concern on the part of the French that they were going to ignore the base and move east.

The battle

Things changed in early March, 1954, when it became clear that an increasing number of Viet Minh (Vietnamese Allied) troops were moving into the area. The battle proper opened on March 13 when, much to the surprise of the French, the Viet Minh unleashed a massive artillery barrage. By the end of the first night 9,000 shells had fallen on the area, and the Beatrice and Gabrielle positions had both fallen, albeit at huge cost to the attackers. In a major logistical feat, the Viet Minh had dragged scores of artillery pieces up steeply forested hillsides that the French had written off as impassable. The French artillery commander, distraught at his inability to bring counterfire on the well-camouflaged Viet Minh batteries, went into his dugout and killed himself with a hand grenade. He was buried there in great secrecy to prevent loss of morale among the French troops.

The French responded by parachuting in reinforcements, but they were fired on by anti-aircraft guns, another surprise on the part of the Viet Minh. Considering the vital need for air supply, this was a troubling development for the defenders of the base. The French also started using their ground attack aircraft against the artillery, but there were not enough to have any real effect, considering how well the guns were hidden.

Realizing the importance of the air supply, the Viet Minh switched from their costly assaults to a siege mode, bombarding the airfields until both were eventually knocked out of action. In addition, they started the process of digging long trenches towards the middle of the camp, covering their movements from direct fire, and allowing for a buildup and assault under cover. The first runway fell after a five-day advance from the 18th to the 23rd. The last aircraft landed on the 28th on the second runway, but was destroyed in the process. The French responded with an offensive of their own on the 28th, attacking anti-aircraft positions. On the 31st the French recaptured two of the hilltop fortifications, but later had to evacuate them due to lack of reinforcements.

With resupply now entirely by parachute, supply flow started to dwindle. A good portion of the airdropped supplies landed in Viet Minh-controlled areas, giving them much needed material. The Vietnamese had essentially won the battle at this point, and they referred to the remainder of the battle as "slowly bleeding the dying elephant". During the last week of April the yearly monsoon arrived, further reducing the effectiveness of any air support that could be given. Trenches became hazards, and bunkers collapsed. The last replacements—4,306 soldiers under General Marcel Bigeard, parachuted in between March 14 and May 6—did not even make up for the loses suffered between those dates, 5,500.

The French saw that defeat was imminent, but they sought to hold on till the Geneva peace meeting, which took place on April 26. The last French offensive took place on May 4, but it was ineffective. The Viet Minh then began to hammer the fort with newly acquired Russian rocket artillery. The final fall took two days, May 6th and 7th, during which the French fought on but were eventually overrun by a huge frontal assault.

At least 2,200 members of the 20,000-strong French forces died during the battle. Of the 100,000 or so Vietnamese involved, there were an estimated 8,000 killed and another 15,000 wounded, almost half of the attacking force, a price Ho Chi Minh was willing to pay for independence.

After the battle

The prisoners taken at Dien Bien Phu were the greatest number the Viet Minh had ever captured: one-third of the total captured during the entire war. The prisoners were divided into groups. The fit and walking wounded were force-marched over 250 miles to prison camps. Hundreds died of disease on the way. The wounded, counted at 4,436, were given basic triage until the Red Cross arrived, removing 838 and giving better aid to the remainder. The remainder were then also sent into detention.

Prison camp was even worse. The French troops, many of them not even French, were constantly starved, beaten, and heaped with abuse. Many died. The Viet Minh used the presence of veteran World War II Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS soldiers serving under the Foreign Legion as propaganda against the French cause. About 3,300 malnourished, defeated prisoners were released in 1958.

Aftermath

The victory by the Viet Minh led to the 1954 Geneva accords, which partitioned Vietnam into communist North Vietnamese and French South Vietnamese administered zones. This partition was supposed to be temporary, and the two zones were supposed to be reunited by national elections in 1956. After the French withdrawal, the U.S. supported the southern government under Ngo Dinh Diem, which opposed the agreement, arguing that Ho Chi Minh from the North had been killing Northern patriots and terrorising people both in the North and the South. This dispute would eventually escalate into the Second Indochina War.

General Giap attempted to recreate the victory at Dien Bien Phu in 1967 at Khe Sanh, but in this case the massively better U.S. air supply and support turned the tables.

External links

DienBienPhu.org in English

Categories: Vietnam War operations and battles