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National Intelligence Service (South Korea)


The NIS (National Intelligence Service) of South Korea, (Korean: 국가정보원 (Guk-ga-Jungbo-won)), was established in 1961 as the Korea Central Intelligence Agency (중앙정보부) (KCIA) during the Park Chung-hee military dictatorship.

The NIS's forerunner, the KCIA, was founded on June 13, 1961 by Kim Jong-pil, a Korean Military Academy graduate (KMA class No. 8/class of 1949), and a nephew of Park Chung-hee by marriage. Kim is also credited for masterminding the successful 1961 coup d'etat that installed Park as dictator. Park remained in this capacity from 1961 to 1979.

The KCIA was extensively used by President Park's military government to actively suppress anything perceived to be anti-government or pro-Northern. In addition to its frequent attempts to squash the ubiquitous student protest movement, it was actively involved overseas in quelling the activities of Koreans abroad that it did not like.

For example, in 1968, KCIA agents kidnapped several Koreans living abroad in West Germany. They were transported back to Seoul, where they were brought up on mostly trumped-up charges of engaging in pro-Northern activities. This act almost brought the Bonn government to break off relations with South Korea. This act served as a harbinger of things to come, when the much-publicized kidnapping from a seaside resort in Japan of pro-democracy dissident, Kim Dae-jung -- who would later become the president of Korea himself and a Nobel Prize Peace Winner in 2000 -- took place in 1973.

Despite such roguish activities, the KCIA remained a well-funded and complex organization rife with political intrigue and massive corruption throughout Park's junta. Suffice it to say that the KCIA's biggest flaw was its assumption of every role possible. It in effect functioned in both intelligence, counterintelligence and domestic suppression roles -- assuming both the roles of the FBI, CIA and local police at once -- in addition to other roles.

The KCIA also functioned as political machine in Korea par none, and was heavily involved in everything from drafting the Korean constitution, to dominating the country's political life, to acting as a political fundraiser. Additionally, in its early days, it operated under the aegis and sponsorship of the U.S. CIA. Indeed, the U.S. CIA is responsible for contributing, if not facilitating to the genesis of the KCIA, though the extent of its involvement is not fully known as that information has been classified for some time. The KCIA's role in the political and national life of Korea in the 1960s and 70s, however, should not be underestimated. The KCIA brought to a head political intrigue, graft, and political scheming, by making it a virtual art form in Korea.

In addition to its intelligence and police role, it also became -- through a network of thousands of agents at home and abroad -- the de facto attorney general and inspector general of the Korean government. In addition, it served as a political party that squashed the power and existence of any rivals, a political think tank that pushed its own agenda, a business promoter that bribed and cajoled foreign governments and companies, a fundraiser (read: extortionist extraordinaire), a student political group watchdog, a philanthropical arm of the government and supporter of the arts, national tourism, etc. In the 1960s, it also supported such groupos as the Reverend Moon Sun-Myung's Unification Church. Since then, its progenitor, the NIS has allegedly committed itself to being dedicated to the nation's "development" and "security".

In 1981, the KCIA changed its name to the "Agency for National Security Planning (NSP)" or "Guk-Ga-An-Jeon-Gi-Hoik-Bu (국가안전기획부)" in Korean. Besides trying to acquire intelligence on North Korea and foil Northern espionage attempts, the NSP again, like its predecessor, was heavily involved in activities outside of its sphere, like promoting the 1988 Summer Olympic Games in Seoul, and domestic politics.

In 1994, the NSP had a significant revision of its charter, which effectively limited its activities, following an agreement between Korea's ruling and opposition parties. As a result, an "Information Committee" in the Assembly was established to lay a foundation for the agency's removal from the political scene and an assumption of political neutrality. The NSP also began to develop procedures and mechanisms to thwart international crime and terrorism.

In 1995, the NSP moved to a new headquarters site in Naegok-dong, southern Seoul, from its previous location on Namsan mountain, in Imun-dong, where it had been for 34 years. In 1999, it was officially renamed as the "National Intelligence Service" (NIS).

Currently, the NIS is divided into three branches: Domestic, International and North Korean Affairs. It can be safely assumed, however, that the NIS's largest role is domestic, specifically with regards to counterespionage and counterintelligence activities. However, the NIS success in catching actual spies or northern agents is extremely low and almost never happens. Nevertheless, it insists that its mission is the following:

The NIS Mission: 1) Collection, coordination, and dissemination of information on the nation's strategy and security;

2)Maintenance of documents, materials, and facilities related to the nation's classified information;

3)Investigation of violations of Korean laws, such as the Military Secrecy Protection Law, the National Security Law. These laws prohibit sedition, insurgent activities, and insurrection


Previous and current Directors General of the KCIA/NSP/NIS

  1. Kim Jong-pil 김종필 61. 5.20 - 63. 1. 6 [ 1년 8개월 ]
  2. Kim Yong-soon 김용순 63. 1. 7 - 63. 2.20 [ 2개월 ]
  3. Kim Jae-choon 김재춘 63. 2.21 - 63. 7.11 [ 5 개월 ]
  4. Kim Hyung-wook 김형욱 63. 7.12 - 69.10.20 [ 5년 3개월 ]
  5. Kim Kye-won 김계원 69.10.21 - 70.12.20 [ 1년 2개월 ]
  6. Lee Hoo-rhak 이후락 70.12.21 - 73.12. 2 [ 3 년 ]
  7. Shin Jik-soo 신직수 73.12. 3 - 76.12. 3 [ 3 년 ]
  8. Kim Jae-kyu 김재규 76.12. 4 - 79.10.26 [ 2년 10개월 ]
  9. Lee Hee-sung 이희성 79.10.30 - 79.12.12 [ 2 개월 ]
  10. Yoon Il-gyun 윤일균(직무대행) 79.12.13 - 80. 4.13 [ 4 개월 ]
  11. Chun Doo-hwan 전두환 80. 4.14 - 80. 7.17 [ 3 개월 ]
  12. Yoo Hak-sung 유학성 80. 7.18 - 82. 6. 1 [ 1년 11개월 ]
  13. Roh Shin-young 노신영 82. 6. 2 - 85. 2.18 [ 2년 8개월 ]
  14. Chang Se-dong 장세동 85. 2.19 - 87. 5.25 [ 2년 3개월 ]
  15. Ahn Moo-hyuk 안무혁 87. 5.26 - 88. 5. 6 [ 1 년 ]
  16. Bae Myong-in 배명인 88. 5. 7 - 88.12. 4 [ 7 개월 ]
  17. Park Se-jik 박세직 88.12. 5 - 89. 7.18 [ 8 개월 ]
  18. Suh Dong-kwon 서동권 89. 7.19 - 92. 3.30 [ 2년 8개월 ]
  19. Lee Sang-yun 이상연 92. 3.31 - 92.10. 8 [ 6 개월 ]
  20. Lee Hyun-Woo 이현우 92.10. 9 - 93. 2.25 [ 4 개월 ]
  21. Kim Deok 김 덕 93. 2.26 - 94.12.23 [ 1년 10개월 ]
  22. Kwon Young-hae 권영해 94.12.24 - 98. 3. 4 [ 3년 2개월 ]
  23. Lee Jong-chan 이종찬 98. 3. 5 - 99. 5.25 [ 1년 3개월 ]
  24. Chun Yong-taek 천용택 99. 5.26 - 99.12.23 [ 7개월 ]
  25. Lim Dong-won 임동원 99.12.24 - 01. 3.26 [ 1년 3개월 ]
  26. Shin Kuhn 신 건 01. 3.27 - 03. 4.24 [ 2년 1개월 ]
  27. Ko Young-koo 고영구 03. 4. 25 - 현재

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01-04-2007 01:32:10
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